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This paper investigates the determinants of European cross-border M&As using a large database.  
Specifically, we identify some of the different factors which contribute to the efficiency of the 
firms and divide these into two groups: those which can be changed through a merger or 
acquisition and those which cannot be altered and are more related to the environment where the 
acquired firm is established.  Using a gravity model we find evidence for both of what have 
become to be known as the governance and outcome hypotheses. Additionally, we do not find any 
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Executive Summary 
 
This paper examines the main determinants of the cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the 
EU. In particular the paper intends to identify the main macroeconomic factors influencing cross-
border mergers and acquisitions and the importance of the regulatory and legal environment for 
merger activities. Moreover, it also looks at the “euro-effects” on M&A, i.e. whether there has 
been a more intense merger and acquisition activity within euro-zone countries.  
   
There has been a considerable increase in the intensity of merger and acquisition (M&A) activities 
during the 1990s - for example, over the 1990s the value of cross-border M&A increased fivefold. 
These developments warrant a better identification and understanding of the factors influencing 
M&A. While the empirical and theoretical literature thus far has explained important 
characteristics and trends of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, the results about why mergers 
occur remain in general limited. 
  
Most empirical papers have found that certain macroeconomic factors (such as GDP, market 
capitalization, stock price) and some institutional aspects influence cross-border M&A activities. 
The legal and regulatory environment within a country might also influence firms’ M&A 
decisions. Differences in laws, regulations and enforcement between countries might increase 
transaction costs and asymmetries in information, which can explain certain characteristics of 
cross-border merger and acquisition activities. There are two main competing theories in the 
literature about the impact of the quality of legal and regulatory systems on M&A, the “outcome 
hypothesis” and the “governance hypothesis” (Rossi and Volpin (2001)).  
 
The outcome hypothesis suggests that good domestic institutions are essential for a higher level of 
M&A activity. The hypothesis predicts that merger and acquisition activities are more intense in 
countries where the investor protection is better (Rossi & Volpin (2002)). This happens partly due 
to the better availability of funds (which is a result of good institutions) and because the 
willingness of the current owner to sell decreases when his private benefits of control are higher. 
Weaker domestic investor protection usually implies higher private benefits of control for the 
owner, therefore implying less intense merger and acquisition activities (Dyck and Zingales 
(2001)). Additionally, efficient, better functioning firms might be more attractive for acquirers 
than firms with lower levels of investor protection and efficiency. According to the governance 
hypothesis, mergers and acquisitions occur more between companies with different levels of 
investor protection. The hypothesis predicts that an active market for corporate control targets 
firms with poor governance. The intuition behind this argument is that an inefficiently managed 
firm becomes a target due to the expected increase in the firm's value after restructuring.  
 
The paper distinguishes between factors influencing the efficiency of the firms which can be 
changed through mergers and acquisitions and those which cannot be altered and are more 
specific to the country where the acquired firm is established.  We find evidence that supports 
both the governance and outcome hypotheses, where according to the governance hypothesis 
companies target firms with poor governance practices, whereas the outcome hypothesis argues 
that M&A activities are more intense between companies with better investor protection. More 
specifically, there are factors influencing corporate governance which can be changed through a 
merger and acquisition transaction. Target companies can adopt certain internal rules of the 
acquirer company, which might improve corporate governance, can gain access to better 
financing, and might increase their value through increased efficiency. Thus mergers and 
acquisitions can improve investor protection and the efficiency of companies located in countries 
with a lower level of investor protection. This implies that the acquirer might have incentives to  
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merge or acquire a less efficient company with weaker investor protection if there are expected 
gains due to adopting more efficient corporate governance practices in the target company. We 
found that, indeed, acquirer companies tend to originate from countries with relatively better legal 
environments and greater availability of finance than target companies. This evidence supports the 
governance hypothesis. However, there are certain factors which cannot be changed through 
mergers or acquisitions, but which also influence investor protection and the efficiency of the 
company. These factors are more inherent to the country where the company is located, such as 
the involvement of the government in the economy (tax rates, transfers and subsidies from the 
state) or the trade regime of the country. Our results suggest that acquirers prefer countries with 
better “quality” of these factors, thus supporting the outcome hypothesis.  
 
The paper also investigates whether countries belonging to the euro-zone have experienced more 
intense M&A activities compared to other countries, but finds no supporting evidence that the 
euro had a significant impact on the intensity of M&A in the euro-zone. Since the examined 
period covered only a very limited period after the introduction of the euro, it is possible that 
positive effects will occur only over the long run. Furthermore, the introduction of the euro was 
followed by a period of recession which might have also limited the benefits of the euro for 
increased integration. It is also possible that while the introduction of the euro did not affect 
merger and acquisition activities at an aggregate level, it influenced activities in certain sectors 
(such as financial sectors). Thus further research looking at the developments of mergers and 
acquisitions in the euro-zone at a sectoral level would be useful in order to explore the possible 
effects of the euro on M&A activities.  
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Introduction 
There has been a considerable increase in the intensity of merger and acquisition (M&A) activities 
during the 1990s - for example, over the 1990s the value of cross-border M&As increased 
fivefold. These developments warrant a better identification and understanding of the factors 
influencing M&As. While the empirical and theoretical literature thus far has explained important 
characteristics and trends of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, the results about why mergers 
occur remain in general limited.  
 
Most of the previous work has concentrated on national merger and acquisition activities and only 
a few papers have examined cross-border M&A. Giovanni (2002) examines the main 
macroeconomic and financial variables which play a key role in FDI decisions of firms by using a 
large panel data set of cross-border M&A deals. Using a gravity model the author finds that 
financial variables (stock market capitalisation, credit provided to the private sector) and some 
other institutional factors (free trade agreements, common language, supply of skilled labour 
force) strongly influence the merger and acquisition decision. Furthermore, regional trade 
agreements are also significant driving factors. Vasconcellos and Kish (1998) use logit and 
multiple regression models to test the influence of macroeconomic factors (exchange rates, bond 
yields and stock prices) on the number and direction of cross-border acquisitions between the US 
and EU (only Germany, Italy, UK and France were included). They conclude, that while both 
stock prices and bond yields are major causal factors, exchange rates do not consistently influence 
M&A decisions. The results suggest that acquisitions occur more when bond yields in the 
acquirer’s country are higher than in the target’s country. Ali-Yrkko (2002) compares Finnish 
M&A activities with merger activities in other countries and finds that most of the cross-sectional 
and time-series variation of the M&A activity in different countries can be explained by GDP, the 
market capitalisation, and the number of listed firms on the stock market. The findings of these 
empirical papers show that certain macroeconomic factors (such as GDP, market capitalization, 
stock prices) and some other institutional factors have an impact on cross-border M&A activities.  
 
The legal and regulatory environment within a country might also influence firms’ M&A 
decisions. Differences in laws, regulations and enforcement between countries might increase 
transaction costs and asymmetries in information, which can explain certain characteristics of 
cross-border mergers and acquisition activities. There are two main competing theories about the  
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impact of the legal and regulatory quality on M&As in the literature, the “outcome hypothesis” 
and the “governance hypothesis” (Rossi and Volpin (2001)).  
 
The outcome hypothesis suggests that good domestic institutions are essential for a higher level of 
M&A activity. The hypothesis predicts that merger and acquisition activities are more intense in 
countries where the investor protection is better (Rossi & Volpin (2002)). This happens partly due 
to the better availability of funds (which is a result of good institutions) and because the 
willingness of the current owner to sell is inversely related to his private benefits of control, which 
are higher the lesser is domestic investor protection (Dyck and Zingales (2001)). Additionally, 
efficient, better functioning firms might be more attractive for acquirers than firms with lower 
levels of investor protection and efficiency. Therefore good domestic institutions in the target 
country are crucial prerequisites for an active market for mergers and acquisitions (Rossi & 
Volpin (2002)). Bris and Cabolis (2002) examine the impact of the differences in corporate 
governance in cross-border mergers on the value of the industry (measured by Tobin’s Q). They 
find that a large part of mergers occurred between firms from countries with similar levels of 
shareholder protection. Rossi and Volpin (2002) find evidence for the outcome hypothesis at the 
national level and conclude that the intensity of M&A activity is higher in countries with better 
investor protection. 
 
According to the governance hypothesis, mergers and acquisitions occur more between companies 
with different levels of investor protection. The hypothesis predicts that an active market for 
corporate control targets firms with poor governance contrary to the outcome hypothesis 
according to which target companies are more likely to be efficient, better functioning firms with 
high level of investor protection. The intuition behind this argument is that an inefficiently 
managed firm becomes a target due to the expected increase in the firm value after restructuring. 
Many studies have found empirical evidence for this at the national level
1. At the international 
level the argument implies that bidder companies originate from countries where investor 
protection is stronger than in the target company’s country. Another explanation than the 
efficiency argument is that companies face high costs of capital and limited access to external 
financing possibilities in countries where investor protection is weak. Therefore bidders from 
countries with better investor protection have an advantage over bidders from other countries. 
Rossi and Volpin (2002) find evidence for the outcome hypotheses at the national level, but at the 
                                                 
1 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a survey of literature.   
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international level they find evidence for the governance hypothesis. They conclude that in the 
case of cross-border mergers and acquisitions the targets are typically from countries with poorer 
investor protection than the acquirers, furthermore the acquirers tend to be from countries with 
better accounting standards and stronger rule of law than the targets. The paper also finds that 
cross-border M&A activity represents a larger fraction of the M&A activity in industries that are 
characterized by greater agency problems. The paper concludes that cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions can be a way for companies to improve their poor governance regime. Although Bris 
and Cabolis (2002) find that M&As occur more between firms from countries with similar levels 
of shareholder protection, they also find that the value of an industry increases when firms within 
that industry are acquired by foreign firms originating from countries with better shareholder 
protection and better accounting standards. The paper argues that there are certain factors which 
can be changed through a merger; while target firms usually adopt the corporate governance 
system of the acquiring firm by law, acquiring companies can adopt the governance practices of 
the target firm by private contracting. However there are certain factors such as creditor protection 
and corruption which are inherent to the country where the firm is located and these factors cannot 
be changed by the firms. Since these latter factors are inherent to the country where the target firm 
operates, target firms do not benefit from cross-border acquisitions from countries with less 
corrupt practices than their own. While the value of an industry can increase by adopting better 
corporate governance practices through mergers, the paper does not find evidence that corporate 
governance is a motive for cross-border M&As.   
 
The objective of the current paper is twofold. First it creates an empirical framework in which 
both the governance and the outcome hypothesises can be examined in the case of cross-border 
mergers. To do so we identify some important factors which contribute to the efficiency of the 
firms and therefore are relevant for testing the governance and outcome hypotheses, and then 
divide these factors into two groups; those which can be changed through a merger or acquisition 
and those which cannot be altered and are more related to the environment where the acquired 
firm is established. This differentiation has a crucial importance when examining the outcome and 
governance hypotheses and allows us to set up a novel and coherent framework in which these 
hypotheses can be appropriately tested. The second objective of the paper is to examine whether 
countries belonging to the euro-zone have experienced more intense M&A activities than other 
countries, a topic that as yet remains unexplored. The adoption of the euro as common currency 
was an important step towards further integrating the economies of European countries and it was 
anticipated that there would be positive effects on financial market integration. One might  
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consequently expect that increased integration of financial markets may have made it easier for 
euro-zone companies to make mergers and acquisitions. This paper investigates the validity of this 
hypothesis empirically. The econometric analysis is conducted using the gravity model framework 
for the empirical assessment, a tool which has been widely used in the trade and FDI literature and 
more recently also in the M&A literature (see, for example, Giovanni (2002)). 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the variables and 
the data used for the estimations. The methodology and the econometric model used for the 
estimation are discussed in the following section. The next part of the paper contains the results. 




Number and value of mergers and acquisitions 
The data used for the empirical analysis are taken from the database of the European Commission 
Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs and cover the period between 1991 and 2001. 
The database covers acquisitions of majority shareholdings with a value over US$1 million or 
unknown. Both public and private mergers and acquisitions are included in the database. We use 
as target countries the EU member countries
3, whereas the bidder countries include EU member 
countries, US, Canada, Norway and Switzerland
4.  Our primary variable of interest is the number 
and value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, although we do not differentiate between 
mergers and acquisitions due to data restrictions.  The value data in the database are incomplete 
since for many deals information on the value of the deal is not provided
5; a total of 24% of the 
values were missing. However, the number of deals is complete. Therefore, we primarily use the 
number of M&As as the dependent variable for our regressions. However to test the robustness of 
our results we also use the values of M&A. 
 
Graph 1 depicts the developments of M&A operations during the period 1991-2001 for the 
countries included in our database (target countries are EU Member States, bidder countries are 
EU Member States, USA, Canada, Norway and Switzerland). Merger activity exhibits a wave 
                                                 
2 A list of all variables used in the empirical analysis and their exact definition is provided in Table 1.  
3 Belgium and Luxembourg aggregated as one country.  
4 Our analysis is limited to these countries due to data restrictions.  
5 Most of the deals with unknown values are probably small deals (Pryor (2001)).  
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pattern. Several waves have been observed during the past with different characteristics. Some 
waves were characterized by diversifying acquisitions, some by hostile takeovers or by increasing 
concentration. The main characteristic of the last wave, which occurred during the 1990s, is that it 
involved deals with very high values and it was the “first-ever international” merger wave (Black 
(2000)). The value of cross-border M&As world-wide increased more than five-fold during the 
period 1990-99, from 153 billion dollars in 1990 to 792 billion dollars (OECD (2001)). The 
number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions followed the same trend; but on a smaller scale, 
i.e., during the same period the number of M&As increased from 2752 in 1990 to 7242 in 1999. 
During this recent wave the large-scale cross-border M&As contributed to the significant increase 
in the value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The average size of cross border M&As 
increased by almost two-fold during the period 1990-1999. Transactions with a value higher than 
1 billion dollars accounted for more than 50% of cross-border M&As, while they represented only 
about 1% of the number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (OECD (2001)).  
 
In comparing the value and number series one should note that the increase in the value of M&A 
was more pronounced than the increase in the number of M&As. While the number of M&A 
operations reached its highest value in 2000, in terms of value the peak was reached already in 
1999. 
Graph 1: Value and number of M&A operations
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In our analysis we also specifically focus on investigating the effects of the Economic and 
Monetary Union on M&A activity. Graph 2 shows the evolution of the M&As within EU member 
states (both target and bidder companies are located in the EU) and within euro-zone countries 
(both target and bidder companies are located in the euro-zone). The graph suggests that M&As 




Legal system and regulatory environment 
The degree of investor protection and corporate governance practices have important effects on 
the efficiency of the firms and thus have important consequences for M&A activities. Differences 
in the investor protection and corporate governance practices across countries are significant. In 
order to understand the effects of corporate governance quality on M&A it is important first to 
identify possible factors influencing corporate governance practices and investor protection.  
 
Corporate governance quality is influenced by the rights of the shareholders and managers of the 
companies. However, these rights depend on the legal rules of the jurisdiction in which the 
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EU-12 total EU-15 
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securities are issued. Therefore national jurisdictions influence corporate governance practices of 
companies, which results in important differences in investor protection between countries. 
However, it is not only the law which influences shareholder rights, but also other characteristics 
of the legal quality such as level of enforcement, stability, complexity of the legal framework etc. 
Since the legal system of the country where the country operates influences the internal rules of 
the company and the quality of the corporate governance, differences in legal systems between 
countries might have important effects on cross-border merger and acquisition decisions.  
 
In a cross-border merger or acquisition the acquired company can adopt the governance practices 
of the acquiring firm by private contracting.
6 In certain cases the nationality of the target firm can 
also change, which might implicate a change in the applicable Corporate Law, although this is 
rare. Nevertheless it is very likely that a target firm with weaker corporate governance would, 
after the merger, adopt the rules of the acquirer company. This implies that corporate governance 
practices can be strengthened through mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Investor protection in a given country can be influenced not only by the quality and efficiency of 
the judicial system but also by the regulatory system of the country (such as credit market 
regulations, competition rules, trade regulations and other business regulations). The regulatory 
environment has an important impact not only on investment choices but also on the efficiency of 
the companies located in the country. Therefore when trying to test the outcome and governance 
hypotheses we take into account not only the legal environment of the target and acquirer’s 
countries, but also regulatory quality and the level of government’s involvement in the economy.  
 
Most of the previous empirical studies used as proxies for the quality of legal systems and 
regulations the indices developed by La Porta, et al. (1998). For example Rossi and Volpin (2002) 
use proxies of  the quality of accounting standards, rule of law, judicial efficiency and creditor 
rights taken from La Porta, et al. (1998). Bris and Cabolis (2002) also use indices of shareholder 
rights, creditor rights, efficiency of the legal system, corruption, and accounting standards from 
La Porta et al. (1998). These indices are mainly limited to legal aspects and provide limited 
proxies for the quality of the regulatory environment. Furthermore there are no time series 
available for these indices, and although some aspects are likely to remain stable, one might 
expect changes over time.  
                                                 
6 For a more detailed discussion on these issues see Bris and Cabolis (2003).  
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To avoid these shortcomings and to enable a more subtle examination of certain regulatory 
aspects which might have important effects on investor protection, we use a different set of 
indices.. More precisely, we employ six different time varying indices to proxy the quality of the 
legal system and regulatory environment of the target and bidder countries. These were taken 
from the Fraser Institute’s “Economic Freedom Network Index”, which ranks 123 countries over 
38 variables, where the 38 variables are composed into five bigger groups. Each component and 
sub-component ranges from 0 to 10 reflecting the distribution of the underlying data. 
Unfortunately the data do not provide annual values for the indices in question, but only for the 
years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2001. To overcome this problem we interpolated the data for the 
missing years; this seems reasonable since during our sample period closer inspection reveals that 
there were no substantial changes for any of the countries in our dataset.  
 
It is convenient to group our six different proxies into two groups.  The first group provides 
measures for factors which can be changed through a merger or acquisition, whereas the second 
group of indices proxies factors which cannot be altered and are more related to the country where 
the firm is active. Four indices were included in the first group. The first two proxy the extent to 
which countries rely on markets or individual choices rather than the political process to allocate 
resources. A greater involvement of the state in the economy might restrict the freedom of the 
companies and therefore influence their functioning and efficiency. The first index measures 
government transfers and subsidies (as a share of GDP), while the second index measures the top 
marginal tax rate. This second index is composed of two sub-indices: top marginal income tax 
rate (and income threshold at which it applies) and top marginal income and payroll tax rate (and 
income threshold at which it applies). The two sub-indices are averaged to calculate the index. 
The index is higher for higher marginal tax rates. Two further indices were included in the 
analysis to provide a proxy for freedom to exchange with foreign countries. In a country where 
important restrictions are applied to trade or capital flows, companies might have disadvantages 
due to restricted available resources. This would negatively effect the efficiency of the firms. The 
first index measures the importance of tariff barriers. The index is composed of the following 
sub-indices: revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports plus imports, 
mean tariff rate, standard deviation of tariff rates. The second index proxies the importance of 
international capital market controls and is composed of two sub-indices: access of citizens to 
foreign capital markets and foreign access to domestic capital markets, restrictions on the freedom 
of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners (index of capital controls among  
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13 IMF categories). While the above factors have an important impact on the “economic 
freedom” of the firms and therefore on investor protection, the importance of these factors for 
local firms cannot be significantly altered through a merger or acquisition.  
 
For the second group the first index consists of a composite measure of the regulatory quality of 
the credit market and is composed of the following indicators: ownership of banks (percentage of 
deposits held in privately owned banks), competition (domestic banks face competition from 
foreign banks), extension of credit (percentage of credit extended to private sector), avoidance of 
interest rate controls and regulations that lead to negative real interest rates, interest rate controls ( 
to the extent the interest rate controls on bank deposits and/or loans are freely determined by the 
market). The second index measures the quality of the legal system and takes into account judicial 
independence, impartiality of courts, protection of intellectual property, military interference in 
the rule of law and the political process and integrity of the legal system. Both the quality of the 
legal system and the quality of the credit market regulations can be “changed” through a merger 
and acquisition. While the applicable Corporate Law might change through a change of the 
nationality of the company, restrictions stemming from the low level of regulatory quality of the 
credit market can be avoided through access to credit markets in the acquirer company’s country.  
 
Table 3 shows the average value of the index variables for each country over the time period 
covered by the analysis. While there are important differences between countries, differences in 
the value of the indices are important within countries as well. With the exception of the United 
Kingdom, all other countries in the sample have values both below and above the average values. 
Table 4 reports the average value of the indices for the bidder and target countries for each year. 
In capital market controls and in taxes on international trade there seems to be an improvement 
over the period both for target and bidder countries, however for the other indices it is not possible 
to determine a trend.  For the indices of credit market regulations, marginal tax rates, transfers and 
subsidies, and legal systems for each year the bidder countries had on average higher values of 
these indices than the target countries. On the other hand in the case of taxes on international trade 
for all years the target countries had higher values than the bidders.  
 
We also control for differences in the legal environment in our empirical analysis.  Laws tend to 
vary a lot across countries, which can be partly explained by differences in legal origin. Civil laws 
give investors weaker legal rights than common laws do, independent of the level of capita 
income (Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998)). Common-law countries provide  
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both shareholders and creditors the strongest, while French-civil-law countries the weakest 
protection. German-civil-law and Scandinavian countries are in between the French – and 
common-law countries.
7 While the legal rules are independent from the level of per capita 
income, the quality of enforcement tends to be higher in richer countries. Generally richer 
Scandinavian and German legal origin countries have better scores on the efficiency of the 
judicial system, while French legal origin countries have the worst quality of law enforcement of 
the four legal traditions even after controlling for per capita income (Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2000)).To take into account similarities in the legal systems between 
countries dummy variables were included in the regression. Four different types of legal systems 
were identified, English-law countries, French civil-law, German and Scandinavian civil law 
countries (following the classification used by R L. Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. 
W. Vishny (1998)) . The dummy takes the value of 1 if both target and bidder countries belong to 
the common law countries (and similarly for French, German and Scandinavian civil law 
countries). The four dummy variables capture whether having similar legal systems between 
bidders and targets influences merger and acquisition activities. In utilising this set of dummy 
variables in our econometric analysis we let the French legal system serve as the base category. 
Macroeconomic variables 
It is also important to control for differences in the macro environment across countries and we do 
so with a number of variables. Firstly we use data on GDP and population that originate from 
Eurostat, and where GDP is taken at current market prices and is given in US$ million. In order to 
capture the importance of financial deepening a market capitalisation ratio was constructed, using 
data on stock market capitalisation obtained for each country from the World Federation of 
Exchanges for each year. More specifically, for each country a ratio of stock market capitalisation 
to GDP was calculated for each year and then the ratio between bidder and target countries’ stock 











This variable provides an approximation of the size of the financial market of the bidder country 
                                                 
7 Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) derived these conclusions after examining a data set covering 
legal rules pertaining to the rights of investors and to the quality of enforcement of these rules in 49 countries that 
have publicly traded companies. While for shareholders rules cover voting powers, ease of participation in corporate 
voting, and legal protections against expropriation by management, for creditors rules relate to security of the loan, 
the ability to grab assets in case of a loan default, inability of management to seek protection from creditors 
unilaterally. 
8 A similar variable was used by Giovanni (2002) to measure the importance of financial deepening, however, instead 
of using a relative market capitalisation variable Giovanni (2002) uses the market capitalisation divided by GDP only  
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relative to the target. The size of the financial market influences the firms financing possibilities, 
larger financial markets tend to provide easier and cheaper funds to finance projects. High market 
capitalisation also helps the company to finance its acquisitions if it uses stocks as a method of 
payment Among US-based firms in the 1990s about 70 percent of all deals involved stock 
compensation, with 58% being entirely stock financed (Andrade, Mitchell, Stafford (2001)).  
 
2.  The methodology 
We use the gravity approach to model the different factors influencing merger and acquisition 
activities. This empirical framework has been widely used for trade, FDI flows and recently to 
examine mergers and acquisitions. The gravity model relates bilateral flows to GDP, distance and 
other factors influencing these bilateral flows. The intuition behind the model is that flows 
between two countries are positively influenced by their economic size and restrained by the 
frictions between them. More specifically, we estimate the following: 
 
where: 
Xijt is the number of mergers and acquisitions where the bidder country is i and target country is j;  
(GDP/POP)ijt is the ratio between the bidder country’s income per capita and the target country’s 
income per capita; 
POPijt  is the ratio between the bidder country’s population and the target country’s population; 
Dij is the distance between the trading centres of the two countries;  
MARCAPijt is the natural logarithm of the ratio between the stock market capitalisation divided 
by GDP of bidder and target countries; 
Indicesijt are different indices measuring the legal and regulatory environment of the bidder and 
target countries;  
DUM is a set of dummies: 
−   Legalenglish, Legalgerman, Legalfrench, Legalscandinavian: a dummy for similar legal 
systems 
                                                                                                                                                               
for the acquirer country. The variable provides a proxy for the firms financing possibilities without taking into 
account other internal financing possibilities.   
(1)  ∑ + + + + + + =
ijk
ijkt ijk ijt ijt ij ijt ijt ijt DUM Indexes MARCAP D POP POP GDP X γ β β β β β α 5 4 3 2 1 ln ln ln ) / (ln ln 
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−   EU: dummy if both countries are members of the EU
9 
−   EURO: dummy if both countries are members of the EURO
10 
−   Canada: dummy if the bidder is Canada 
−   US: dummy if the bidder is the United States 
 
The dependent variable in our model is a count variable which takes on nonnegative integer 
values. The method used has to account for the predominance of zeros and small values and the 
discrete nature of the dependent variable. Therefore OLS estimation would be inappropriate. 
Instead the Poisson regression model has been widely used to study such data. More precisely, the 
Poisson regression model specifies that each yi (dependent variable) is drawn from a Poisson 
distribution with parameter λ i , which is related to the regressors xi (Greene (2000)). The primary 
equation of the model is the following: 
 
where  
j i X ' ln β λ = . 
The Poisson distributional assumption imposes that the conditional variance has to equal the 
mean. We tested for this constraint and found overdispersion in our data. Proceeding with poisson 
regression would result in inefficient parameter estimates with biased variances. As hypothesis 
tests based on these estimates would be incorrect, we apply a negative binomial model. The 
negative binomial regression model relaxes the Poisson assumption that the mean equals the 
variance and allows overdispersion. The probability distribution of the negative binomial model is 
then the following:  
 
Our data are cross-sectional time series data covering a ten years time period. As the differences 
between the groups (target countries) are found to be significant, a fixed effect negative binomial 
panel regression (including time and country specific fixed effects) model was chosen  to 
                                                 
9Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in January 1996, the dummy is set accordingly.  
10 The EURO dummy takes values only after the introduction of the euro (from the year 1999). 
(3) 
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undertake our analysis. Given our interest in some time invariant variables in our specification, we 
do not include country-partner fixed effects in the estimation.  
 
In order to check the robustness of our results we also run the regressions on the values of the 
mergers and acquisitions. The main problem related to the value data is the important number of 
zeros and missing values (about one quarter of the value data is missing and one quarter of the 
values are zeros). Due to the large number of zeros we use a random effect tobit model for the 
specifications where the value of M&As serves as the dependent variable.  
3.  Results 
Results from the regression using the number of M&As as dependent variable 
Table 6 presents the results of three different equations, where we experiment with alternative sets 
of controls. One should first of all note that for the variables that are common across all the three 
estimated coefficients are of similar size and significance. More precisely, the coefficient of 
distance was significant and negative in all regressions. Thus, as the distance between the location 
of bidder and target increases, the merger activity between them decreases. The coefficients of the 
GDP/POP, Population and MARCAP variables all suggest that companies are more likely to be 
targeted by foreign buyers if located in countries which are relatively less “developed” compared 
to the acquirer’s country. The variable MARCAP captures the relative size of market 
capitalisation and provides a proxy for the size of the financial market of the bidder country 
relative to the target. Its positive and significant coefficient implies that a merger or acquisition is 
more likely to occur in cases where bidder countries have achieved relatively higher market 
capitalisation than target countries.  
 
The Legalsystem variable reflects the relative quality of the legal system of the bidder compared 
to the target country. Thus, the positive and significant coefficient of the Legalsystem variable 
implies that a company tends to target a firm operating in a market with relatively less developed 
investor protection. The coefficient of the variable reinforces the governance hypothesis given 
that the probability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions increases with relative investor 
protection of the bidder compared to the target.  
 
The regulatory quality of the credit market is measured by the Creditmarket variable. This 
variable is the ratio between the index of credit market regulation of bidder and target country. 
Similarly to the Legalsystem variable, the results suggests that cross-border mergers are more  
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likely between countries where the bidder country has a better quality of credit market regulation 
relative to the target countries (equations (1) and (2)).  
 
As indicated by the correlation matrix given in the Appendix, a few index variables are highly 
correlated; therefore these explanatory variables are not included in the same equations. For 
example, the top marginal tax rate variable is highly correlated with government transfers and 
subsidies, and thus they both proxy the same factor, the importance of the state’s involvement in 
the economy. Nevertheless, as a robustness test, we run two separate regressions, first including 
only the variable of government transfers and subsidies and next including only the variable of top 
marginal tax rate. The index measuring the importance of tariff barriers is highly correlated with 
the EU dummy and therefore it is not included in all the equations.  
 
Indices of capital market control and tariffs were included separately both for target and bidder 
countries. Tariff barriers are not important in the case of bidder countries; however the coefficient 
for target countries is significant and positive (equation (2)). This result suggests that companies 
located in countries with more liberal trade regimes are more likely to be targets. It also shows 
that cross-border mergers and acquisitions are not motivated by “tariff jumping”. Similarly the 
coefficient of the capital market controls variable is positive and significant for the target country, 
and not significant for the bidder (equations (1) and (3)).  
 
Two indices were included in the regressions measuring the importance of the government’s 
involvement in the economy. The coefficient of the index measuring government transfers and 
subsidies was significant and negative for the bidder countries, while positive and significant for 
the target countries (equations (1) and (2)). Similar results were obtained for the index measuring 
the top marginal tax rate (equation (3)). A more beneficial tax regime attracts companies, and 
gives higher probabilities for companies to be targets when located in countries with less 
burdensome taxation systems. The coefficient of these indices suggests that acquirer companies 
prefer firms located in countries where the state involvement in the economy is lower.  
 
The findings above reinforce both the outcome hypothesis and the governance hypothesis. In 
countries where available financing possibilities are weaker, captured by the Creditmarket 
variable, companies are more likely to be targets. Through a cross-border merger in which the 
acquirer company is located in a country where the availability of financing is better, the target 
company may achieve efficiency improvements. Similarly, the bidders’ better legal protection for  
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shareholders can be extended to some extent to the targets. The results show that for these factors 
it is indeed the quality of an acquirer's country which matters, and not that of the target. On the 
other hand, there are certain factors which cannot be changed through a merger, although they still 
influence investor protection and the quality of the corporate governance. For these factors the 
outcome hypothesis is supported by our results; companies located in countries with a higher 
quality of regulatory environment and higher “economic freedom” are more likely to be targets 
than countries with greater involvement of government in the economy (in the form of tax regime) 
and lower level of openness.  
 
The second objective of the study was to examine whether countries which are members of the 
euro-zone have more intensive merger and acquisition activity between them than other member 
states of the EU. Table 7 shows the results of the regressions analysing a possible “euro-effect” 
using two sets of variables. The difference between these two sets of variables is that the first 
includes the variables measuring the significance of government transfers and subsidies, while the 
second set contains the variables measuring tax rates instead of transfers and subsidies. In the first 
equation an EU dummy is included, the coefficient of which is positive and implies that when 
both target and bidder countries are EU members the propensity of the occurrence of mergers and 
acquisitions between them is higher than between EU countries and non member states. The 
second equation includes a dummy for the euro-zone countries. When the EURO dummy is 
included the coefficient of the EU dummy becomes smaller as the coefficient of the EURO is 
positive and highly significant. However, the positive and significant coefficient of the EURO 
dummy is likely to reflect the general developments of mergers and acquisitions in the EU area 
rather than a positive impact of the euro on M&A activities. This result seems to capture the 
increased merger and acquisition activities which took place within the EU compared to countries 
outside the EU. Several merger waves have been observed during the past. Our period also 
includes a noticeable wave of merger and acquisition activities. Table 2 shows the number of 
mergers and acquisitions between different groups of countries during 1991-2001. The number of 
M&A reached a peak for EU countries in 2000, while for non-EU countries the number of M&A 
increased until 1998 and then started to decline (mainly due to the influence of the US and 
Canada). The wave followed the same trend in euro-zone member states as in other EU member 
states. Therefore we cannot conclude from our empirical analysis that there was increased merger 
and acquisition activity between euro-zone countries compared to other EU member states. In the 
third equation a EURO dummy was included together with two types of EU dummies. One of the 
EU dummies (EUy9901) only takes values for the same period as the EURO dummy (1999- 
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2001), the other EU dummy (EU) takes values for the whole period. While the EU dummy which 
is included for the same period as the EURO dummy is positive and significant, the EURO 
dummy becomes insignificant. These results imply that after the introduction of the euro, merger 
and acquisition activities were not more frequent between member countries of the euro-zone than 
between non euro-zone countries.  
 
Results from the regression using the value of M&As 
The results using the values are very similar to the previously obtained results using the numbers 
of mergers and acquisitions (Tables 8 and 9). The variable reflecting the quality of the legal 
system is positive and significant, confirming that the probability of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions increases with higher relative investor protection of the bidder compared to the target. 
The index measuring the relative quality of the credit market regulations is also significant and 
positive. Additionally, the indices measuring the quality of the taxes and the tariff barriers have 
the same sign as in the previous regressions using the values as dependent variables and the 
coefficients are significant. These estimates show that the results obtained with the negative 
binomial regressions are robust.  
 
The EU dummy is significant in the first equation similarly to the results obtained in the previous 
results. The EURO dummy is significant and positive in the second equation, but becomes 
insignificant in the third equation (in which the EU dummy is included for the same period as the 
EURO dummy) while the EU dummy becomes significant.  
4.  Conclusions 
This paper aimed to identify the main macroeconomic factors influencing the European cross-
border mergers and acquisitions.  We do so by distinguishing between factors influencing the 
efficiency of the firms which can be changed through a merger and acquisition and those which 
cannot be altered and are more specific to the country where the acquired firm is established.   
 
We find evidence that supports both the governance and outcome hypotheses, where according to 
the governance hypothesis companies target firms with poor governance practices whereas the 
outcome hypothesis argues that M&A activities are more intense between companies with better 
investor protection. More specifically, there are factors influencing corporate governance which 
can be changed through a merger and acquisition transaction. Target companies can adopt certain 
inside rules of the acquirer company, which might improve corporate governance, can have access  
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to better financing, and might increase the value of the firm through increased efficiency. Thus 
mergers and acquisitions can improve investor protection and the efficiency of companies located 
in countries with a lower level of investor protection. This implies that the acquirer might have 
incentives to merge or acquire a less efficient company with weaker investor protection if there 
are expected gains due to adopting more efficient corporate governance practices in the target 
company. We found that, indeed, acquirer companies tend to originate from countries with 
relatively better legal environments and greater availability of finance than target companies. This 
evidence supports the governance hypothesis. However, there are certain factors which cannot be 
changed through mergers or acquisitions, but which also influence investor protection and the 
efficiency of the company. These factors are more inherent to the country where the company is 
located, such as the involvement of the government in the economy (tax rates, transfers and 
subsidies from the state) or trade regime of the country. Our results suggest that acquirers prefer 
countries with better “quality” of these factors thus supporting the outcome hypothesis.  
 
The paper also investigated whether countries belonging to the euro-zone have experienced more 
intense M&A activities than other countries, but found no supporting evidence that the euro had a 
significant impact on the intensity of M&As in the euro-zone. Since the examined period covered 
only a very limited period after the introduction of the euro, it is possible that positive effects will 
occur only over the long run. It is also possible that while the introduction of the euro did not 
affect merger and acquisition activities at an aggregate level, it influenced activities in certain 
sectors (such as financial sectors). Thus further research looking at the developments of mergers 
and acquisitions in the euro-zone at a sectoral level would be useful in order to explore the 
possible effects of the euro on M&A activities in the euro-zone.   
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Table 1  Description of variables used in the regression 
 
Variable   Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
MergersA Number  of  M&As  3025  9.642  22.890  0.000  467.00 
LGDPpop  Log of GDP per population  3025  0.066  0.499  -1.262  1.437 
LPOP  Log of population  3025  0.086  1.556  -3.127  4.311 
LDistance  Log of distance  3025  7.230  0.803  5.620  9.078 
LMARCAP  Log of stock market 
capitalization ratio 
3025 0.103  0.908  -2.856 3.046 
Btransfersandsubsidies Index of government transfers 
and subsidies for bidder 
country 
3025 4.396  1.469  0.800  9.000 
Ttransfersandsubsidies  Index of government transfers 
and subsidies for target country 
3025 4.051  1.433  0.800  9.000 
Btopmarginaltaxrate  Index of top marginal tax rate 
for bidder country 
3025 3.119  1.956  0.100  8.000 
Ttopmarginaltaxrate  Index of top marginal tax rate 
for target country 
3025 2.440  1.353  0.100  6.000 
creditmarketreg  Relative index of credit market 
regulation  
3025 1.025  0.179  0.579  1.728 
Bcapitalmarket  Index of capital market control 
for bidder country 
3025 8.233  1.342  2.532  9.919 
Tcapitalmarket  Index of capital market control 
for target country 
3025 8.142  1.489  2.532  9.919 
Legalsystem  Relative index of the quality of 
legal systems 
3025 1.029  0.165  0.593  1.687 
Ttarrifs  Index of trade barriers for 
target country 
3025 8.633  0.550  5.900  9.900 
Btarrifs  Index of trade barriers for 
bidder country 
3025 8.794  0.286  7.998  9.300 
Canada  Dummy for Canada   3025  0.055  0.227  0.000  1.000 
US  Dummy for US  3025  0.055  0.227  0.000  1.000 
Legalenglish  Dummy for English legal 
system country pairs 
3025 0.022  0.146  0.000  1.000 
Legalgerman  Dummy for German legal 
system country pairs 
3025 0.015  0.120  0.000  1.000 
Legalscandinavian  Dummy for Scandinavian legal 
system country pairs 
3025 0.033  0.178  0.000  1.000 
EU  Dummy for EU country pairs  3025  0.646  0.478  0.000  1.000 
EURO99  Dummy for euro-zone country 
pairs 
3025 0.119  0.324  0.000  1.000 
euy9901  Dummy for EU country pairs 
from year 1999 
3025 0.213  0.410  0.000  1.000  
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Table 2  Number of Mergers and acquisitions between different groups of countries 
 
 All  countries  Euro-zone 
countries 




1991  1855 867 1262 395  593 
1992  1764 801 1164 363  600 
1993  1724 696 1026 330  698 
1994  1949 793 1175 382  774 
1995  2229 864 1328 464  901 
1996  2166 752 1177 425  989 
1997  2486 851 1360 509 1126 
1998  2888 995 1564 569 1324 
1999 3197  1330  2015  685  1182 
2000 3742  1778  2550  772  1192 
2001 2743  1288  1890  602  853 
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Austria 7.392  2.000  3.467  8.733  7.65  8.897 
Belg-Lux  8.53 1.848 3.298 8.844 9.485 8.344 
Canada  8.583  3.808 5.868 7.255 8.399 8.928 
Denmark 9.218  .6427 3.522 8.844 8.104 9.088 
Finland 8.927  1.677  4.65  8.724  6.917  9.165 
France  8.435  2.177 2.664 8.844 6.846 7.665 
Germany 7.754  3.262 4.347 8.799 9.636 8.955 
Greece 6.282  4.438  5.95  8.826  6.132  6.334 
Ireland 8.289  2.979  4.82  8.57  7.833  8.752 
Italy  6.699  1.649 3.169 8.871 7.575 7.105 
Netherlands  9.118  1.534 2.461 8.799 9.262 9.114 
Norway  8.353  3.197  4.039 7.97 8.196  8.865 
Portugal 7.132  3.353  6.224 8.78 7.494  7.837 
Spain  8.045  2.935 5.315 8.762 8.036  7.32 
Sweden  8.491  .9926 1.847 8.935 8.642 8.786 
Switzerland  8.118  7.908  5.401 8.76 9.489  8.983 
UK  9.371  5.266 5.613 8.753 9.398 8.800 
United  States  9.153  6.908 6.498 8.254 8.254 8.803 
Average   8.216  3.143 4.397 8.629 8.186 8.430 
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  target bidder  target bidder  target bidder target bidder target  bidder target bidder
1991  8.580 8.872 2.624 3.656 4.176 4.634 8.482 8.438 8.006 8.125 8.038 8.226
1992  8.393 8.762 2.598 3.845 4.035 4.606 8.517 8.434 7.922 8.190 8.076 8.295
1993  8.433 8.741 2.686 4.123 3.888 4.628 8.571 8.433 8.234 8.424 8.195 8.439
1994  8.359 8.667 2.625 4.192 3.638 4.588 8.627 8.426 8.453 8.632 8.294 8.584
1995  8.285 8.601 2.837 4.212 3.681 4.396 8.673 8.458 8.752 8.793 8.417 8.678
1996  8.298 8.675 2.802 4.467 3.727 4.646 8.767 8.498 8.797 8.708 8.522 8.768
1997  8.334 8.701 2.916 4.480 3.893 4.765 8.859 8.570 8.767 8.707 8.576 8.859
1998  8.389 8.701 3.026 4.511 4.008 4.873 8.953 8.630 8.761 8.656 8.623 8.910
1999  8.369 8.605 2.965 4.192 4.042 4.764 9.054 8.776 8.732 8.673 8.700 8.935
2000  8.405 8.564 3.165 4.053 4.197 4.725 9.149 8.912 8.728 8.665 8.767 8.946
2001  8.373 8.551 2.908 3.991 4.273 4.812 9.200 8.959 8.577 8.613 8.269 8.472
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Table 5  Legal system of countries included in the analysis 
 
Legal system  Target countries  Bidder countries 
    
English   Ireland  Ireland 
 UK  UK 
   Canada 
   US 
French   Belgium-Luxembourg  Belgium-Luxembourg 
 France  France 
 Greece  Greece 
 Italy  Italy 
 Netherlands  Netherlands 
 Portugal  Portugal 
 Spain  Spain 
German   Austria  Austria 
 Germany  Germany 
   Switzerland 
Scandinavian   Denmark  Denmark 
 Finland  Finland 
 Sweden  Sweden 
   Norway 
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Table 6  Regression results using the number of M&A as dependent variable 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
LGDPpop  0.352 0.270 0.663 
  (0.068)** (0.066)** (0.064)** 
LPOP 0.593 0.634 0.625 
  (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.016)** 
LDistance  -0.774 -0.815 -0.761 
  (0.029)** (0.027)** (0.028)** 
LMARCAP  0.377 0.344 0.441 
  (0.025)** (0.022)** (0.028)** 
Btransfersandsubsidies  -0.081 -0.108  
  (0.011)** (0.010)**  
Ttransfersandsubsidies  0.143 0.094  
  (0.019)** (0.017)**  
creditmarketreg  0.792 1.377 0.618 
  (0.168)** (0.160)** (0.166)** 
Bcapitalmarket -0.013    -0.025 
 (0.013)   (0.014) 
Tcapitalmarket 0.116    0.084 
 (0.013)**   (0.013)** 
Legalsystem  1.391 0.908 0.982 
  (0.184)** (0.155)** (0.176)** 
Canada  0.537 0.426 0.425 
  (0.101)** (0.106)** (0.100)** 
US  1.293 1.171 1.067 
  (0.097)** (0.092)** (0.095)** 
Legalenglish  1.557 1.578 1.593 
  (0.072)** (0.070)** (0.063)** 
Legalgerman  1.311 1.318 1.275 
  (0.070)** (0.064)** (0.070)** 
Legalscandinavian  1.419 1.407 1.416 
  (0.063)** (0.056)** (0.066)** 
EU  0.280 0.040 0.283 
 (0.043)**  (0.042)  (0.045)** 
Ttarrifs   1.033   
  (0.050)**   
Btarrifs   -0.034   
  (0.038)   
Btopmarginaltaxrate    -0.043  
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   (0.010)** 
Ttopmarginaltaxrate    0.294 
   (0.018)** 
Constant 2.824  -4.126  3.350 
  (0.341)** (0.479)** (0.327)** 
Observations  3025 3025 3025 
Number  of  group(target)  14 14 14 
 
 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses      
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%          
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Table 7  Euro effects, using the number of M&A as dependent variable 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
LGDPpop  0.352 0.470 0.455 0.663 0.686 0.688 
 (0.068)**  (0.068)**  (0.067)**  (0.064)** (0.064)** (0.064)** 
LPOP  0.593 0.616 0.618 0.625 0.632 0.634 
 (0.016)**  (0.015)**  (0.015)**  (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
LDistance -0.774  -0.777  -0.797 -0.761 -0.774 -0.802 
 (0.029)**  (0.028)**  (0.028)**  (0.028)** (0.028)** (0.028)** 
LMARCAP  0.377 0.382 0.357 0.441 0.421 0.401 
 (0.025)**  (0.023)**  (0.023)**  (0.028)** (0.026)** (0.025)** 
Btransfersandsubsidi
es 
-0.081 -0.060 -0.092       
 (0.011)**  (0.011)**  (0.011)**       
Ttransfersandsubsidi
es 
0.143 0.123 0.061       
 (0.019)**  (0.018)**  (0.018)**       
creditmarketreg  0.792 1.186 1.175 0.618 1.000 0.997 
 (0.168)**  (0.163)**  (0.160)**  (0.166)** (0.164)** (0.160)** 
Bcapitalmarket -0.013  -0.028  -0.011 -0.025 -0.036 -0.020 
 (0.013)  (0.013)*  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013)**  (0.013) 
Tcapitalmarket  0.116 0.109 0.095 0.084 0.081 0.078 
 (0.013)**  (0.012)**  (0.012)**  (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
Legalsystem  1.391 1.284 0.977 0.982 1.012 0.752 
 (0.184)**  (0.175)**  (0.172)**  (0.176)** (0.170)** (0.168)** 
Canada  0.537 0.505 0.589 0.425 0.448 0.488 
 (0.101)**  (0.099)**  (0.098)**  (0.100)** (0.099)** (0.097)** 
US  1.293 1.157 1.296 1.067 1.028 1.142 
 (0.097)**  (0.095)**  (0.094)**  (0.095)** (0.093)** (0.092)** 
Legalenglish  1.557 1.530 1.567 1.593 1.560 1.569 
 (0.072)**  (0.071)**  (0.069)**  (0.063)** (0.064)** (0.064)** 
Legalgerman  1.311 1.300 1.327 1.275 1.270 1.296 
 (0.070)**  (0.066)**  (0.065)**  (0.070)** (0.067)** (0.066)** 
Legalscandinavian  1.419 1.451 1.389 1.416 1.434 1.374 
 (0.063)**  (0.062)**  (0.059)**  (0.066)** (0.065)** (0.062)** 
EU  0.280 0.207 0.051 0.283 0.230 0.072 
 (0.043)**  (0.042)**  (0.042)  (0.045)** (0.045)**  (0.045) 
EURO99   0.505  0.009  0.433  0.047 
   (0.035)**  (0.047)   (0.036)**  (0.046)  
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euy9901     0.583    0.480 
     (0.040)**    (0.039)** 
Btopmarginaltaxrate       -0.043 -0.029 -0.044 
       (0.010)**  (0.009)**  (0.009)** 
Ttopmarginaltaxrate       0.294  0.237  0.189 
       (0.018)**  (0.018)**  (0.018)** 
Constant  2.824 2.859 3.797 3.350 3.311 3.965 
 (0.341)**  (0.331)**  (0.333)**  (0.327)** (0.320)** (0.319)** 
Observations  3025 3025 3025 3025 3025 3025 
Number of 
group(target) 
14 14 14 14 14 14  
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Table 8  Regression results using the values as dependent variable 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
LGDPpop 1.551  1.251  1.838 
 (0.232)**  (0.217)**  (0.202)** 
LPOP 1.296  1.481  1.387 
 (0.062)**  (0.062)**  (0.065)** 
LDistance  -1.802 -1.653 -1.836 
 (0.115)**  (0.108)**  (0.112)** 
LMARCAP 0.892  0.825  0.834 
 (0.095)**  (0.086)**  (0.102)** 
Btransfersandsubsidies -0.128 -0.236   
 (0.050)*  (0.048)**   
Ttransfersandsubsidies 0.152 -0.037   
 (0.053)**  (0.049)   
creditmarketreg 0.576  1.584  1.465 
 (0.578)  (0.545)**  (0.599)* 
Bcapitalmarket 0.082    0.026 
 (0.055)    (0.055) 
Tcapitalmarket 0.346    0.337 
 (0.048)**    (0.049)** 
Legalsystem 2.474  1.398  2.319 
 (0.589)**  (0.545)*  (0.585)** 
Canada 1.796  1.030  1.532 
 (0.348)**  (0.393)**  (0.349)** 
US 2.399  1.251  1.790 
 (0.413)**  (0.409)**  (0.419)** 
Legalenglish 2.337  2.139  2.038 
 (0.346)**  (0.327)**  (0.352)** 
Legalgerman 0.372  0.516  0.343 
  (0.458) (0.432) (0.458) 
Legalscandinavian 2.481  3.022  2.234 
 (0.305)**  (0.297)**  (0.311)** 
EU  0.754 -0.167 0.589 
  (0.170)** (0.172) (0.173)** 
Ttarrifs   3.487   
   (0.241)**   
Btarrifs   -0.010  
   (0.154)  
Btopmarginaltaxrate     -0.024  
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     (0.039) 
Ttopmarginaltaxrate     0.355 
     (0.052)** 
Constant  8.114 -15.752 7.427 
 (1.262)**  (1.993)**  (1.274)** 
Observations 2327  2327  2327 
Number of group(target)  14  14  14 
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Table 9  Euro effects, using the value of M&A as dependent variable 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
LGDPpop  1.551 1.565 1.657 1.838 1.917 1.741 
 (0.232)**  (0.227)**  (0.223)**  (0.202)** (0.198)** (0.192)** 
LPOP  1.296 1.314 1.269 1.387 1.410 1.326 
 (0.062)**  (0.061)**  (0.060)**  (0.065)** (0.063)** (0.061)** 
LDistance -1.802  -1.814  -1.905 -1.836 -1.824 -1.952 
 (0.115)**  (0.113)**  (0.111)**  (0.112)** (0.110)** (0.108)** 
LMARCAP  0.892 0.907 0.908 0.834 0.853 0.984 
 (0.095)**  (0.093)**  (0.091)**  (0.102)** (0.099)** (0.097)** 
Btransfersandsubs
idies 
-0.128 -0.123 -0.157       
 (0.050)*  (0.049)*  (0.048)**       
Ttransfersandsubsi
dies 
0.152 0.157 0.092       
 (0.053)**  (0.052)**  (0.051)       
creditmarketreg  0.576 0.644 0.671 1.465 1.573 0.318 
 (0.578)  (0.567)  (0.554)  (0.599)*  (0.579)**  (0.563) 
Bcapitalmarket  0.082 0.041 0.002 0.026 -0.021  -0.003 
  (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) 
Tcapitalmarket 0.346 0.324 0.286 0.337 0.316 0.275 
 (0.048)**  (0.048)**  (0.047)**  (0.049)** (0.048)** (0.047)** 
Legalsystem  2.474 2.498 2.091 2.319 2.315 2.139 
 (0.589)**  (0.578)**  (0.566)**  (0.585)** (0.574)** (0.560)** 
Canada  1.796 1.766 2.038 1.532 1.465 1.832 
 (0.348)**  (0.341)**  (0.335)**  (0.349)** (0.342)** (0.333)** 
US  2.399 2.304 2.644 1.790 1.636 2.401 
 (0.413)**  (0.406)**  (0.399)**  (0.419)** (0.408)** (0.393)** 
Legalenglish  2.337 2.463 2.445 2.038 2.269 2.136 
 (0.346)**  (0.340)**  (0.332)**  (0.352)** (0.345)** (0.336)** 
Legalgerman  0.372 0.192 0.190 0.343 0.180 0.103 
  (0.458) (0.449) (0.439) (0.458) (0.448) (0.437) 
Legalscandinavian  2.481 2.567 2.143 2.234 2.283 2.317 
 (0.305)**  (0.300)**  (0.296)**  (0.311)** (0.303)** (0.301)** 
EU  0.754 0.461 0.115 0.589 0.284 0.050 
 (0.170)**  (0.171)**  (0.171) (0.173)** (0.172)  (0.172) 
EURO99   1.432  -0.007  1.567  0.003 
   (0.172)**  (0.227)   (0.173)**  (0.224) 
euy9901     1.802     1.727  
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     (0.193)**     (0.191)** 
Btopmarginaltaxra
te 
    -0.024  -0.031  -0.064 
       (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.037) 
Ttopmarginaltaxra
te 
    0.355  0.324  0.207 
       (0.052)**  (0.051)**  (0.050)** 
Constant  8.114 8.625  10.685  7.427 7.902  10.915 
 (1.262)**  (1.241)**  (1.235)**  (1.274)** (1.247)** (1.224)** 
Observations  2327 2327 2327 2327 2327 2327 
Number of 
group(target) 
14 14 14 14 14 14 - 37 
Appendix: Pairwise correlation matrix of variables 
 

































LGDPpop  1                         
LPOP  -0.054  1                      
LDistance  0.04*  0.276*  1                    
LMARCAP  0.309*  0.119*  0.122* 1                  
Btransfersandsubsidies  -0.306  0.16*  0.447*  0.087*  1                
Ttransfersandsubsidies  0.48*  -0.005  0.184*  0.071*  -0.034  1              
Btopmarginaltaxrate  0.039*  0.249*  0.271*  0.308*  0.663*  -0.013  1            
Ttopmarginaltaxrate  0.376*  -0.224*  0.071*  -0.025  -0.023  0.650*  -0.016  1          
acreditmarketreg  0.57* -0.039*  0.156*  0.638*  -0.092* 0.210*  -0.024  0.230*  1           
Bcapitalmarketcontr  0.29* 0.067*  -0.197*  0.330* -0.101*  0.018  0.150*  0.062*  0.241*  1         
Tcapitalmarketcontr  -0.246 -0.101*  -0.203*  -0.290*  0.021  -0.179*  0.048*  0.004 -0.352*  0.091*  1       
Legalsystem  0.670* -0.233* 0.120*  0.297*  -0.100*  0.270*  0.007  0.257* 0.6347*  0.250*  -0.259*  1     
Ttarrifs  -0.074 -0.052*  -0.383*  -0.070*  -0.216*  0.071*  -0.146*  0.092* -0.10*  0.158*  0.111*  -0.099* 1   
Btarrifs  -0.043 -0.057* -0.014  -0.025  0.117*  -0.051*  0.118*  0.107* -0.023  0.230*  0.400*  0.070*  0.407*  1 
Canada  -0.017 0.085* 0.453*  0.092*  0.241*  -0.001  0.084*  0.000 0.060*  0.030 0.004  0.087*  -0.602*  0.001 
US  0.13* 0.426*  0.478*  0.198*  0.344*  -0.001  0.460*  0.000 0.150*  0.004  0.004  0.065*  -0.166*  0.001 
Legalenglish  0.022 0.107*  0.101*  -0.012  0.149* 0.121*  0.139*  0.186*  -0.014  0.021  0.047*  -0.020  -0.156*  -0.069* 
Legalgerman  0.030 -0.057*  -0.131*  0.117*  0.021  -0.012  0.134*  0.017  0.009  0.075*  0.041*  -0.019  0.029  -0.012 
Legalscandinavian  0.001 -0.024  -0.193*  -0.064* -0.100*  -0.091*  -0.124* -0.182*  -0.044*  -0.033  -0.031  -0.038*  -0.029  0.026 
EU  -0.213* -0.066* -0.370*  -0.17*  -0.187*  0.098*  -0.372*  0.119* -0.076*  0.039*  0.115*  -0.113*  0.5238*  0.251* 
EURO99 -0.057*  -0.017  -0.099*  -0.053*  -0.049*  0.035  -0.046*  0.116*  -0.036*  0.084*  0.1009*  -0.028  0.338*  0.445* 
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 Canada  US  Legalenglish  Legalgerman Legalscandinavian  EU 
Canada   1           
US -0.058*  1         
Legalenglish 0.183*  0.183* 1       
Legalgerman -0.029  -0.029  -0.018  1     
Legalscandinavian -0.040*  -0.040*  -0.028  -0.022  1   
EU -0.325*  -0.325*  -0.098*  -0.095*  -0.109*  1 
EURO99 -0.088*  -0.088*  -0.050*  0.006  -0.0677*  0.272* 
 